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CUSTOMARY IVORY LAW: INEFFICIENT PROBLEM
SOLVING WITH CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Mike Graves †
Abstract:
For one of only two principal sources of international law,
customary international law is surprisingly opaque. Scholars disagree not only on
whether a particular norm has become a customary law, but also on what constitutes
persuasive evidence of that fact. One popular theory advanced by Anthony D’Amato and
others—that treaties can provide sufficient evidence of customary international law—
attempts to clarify and simplify the process. It does so at the expense of accuracy. This
error is particularly clear in the context of environmental law.
Customary international law, such scholars argue, protects a wide variety of
creatures and natural resources. As evidence, they cite to treaties on conservation, noting
their widespread international support. For the African elephant, this is, at best, a legal
fiction. Sobering reports of elephant population declines throughout most of Africa
indicate an uncertain future for the species. This article argues that these scholarly
assertions are erroneously made based on a theory of customary law that gives excessive
weight to treaties as evidence of custom.
The purpose of this article is to examine the conceptual and evidentiary problems
inherent in relying on treaties to articulate customary international law. Primarily, it
analyzes the habit of tribunals and scholars using treaties this way to artificially assert,
and thereby create, customary international law to address global social problems. This
phenomenon is especially clear in the context of the ivory trade. Using China as a case
study, this article concludes that asserting customary international law where there is
little evidence for it may ultimately hinder solutions to the very problems the advocates
seek to resolve.

INTRODUCTION
Customary international law cannot save the elephant. Or rather,
current popular theories of customary international law make it immaterial
to the survival of the elephant. Increasingly, tribunals and scholars argue
that treaties supplant other forms of evidence used to establish customary
international law.1 These arguments have produced a theory of custom
formation that holds that treaties can provide sufficient evidence for both of
the necessary elements of customary international law. 2 That is, a relevant
†

Mike Graves is a J.D. Candidate at University of Washington School of Law, expected to graduate
in June 2017. The author would like to thank Professor Melissa Durkee for her guidance and advice, and
the staff of the Washington International Law Journal for their work.
1
See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 31
(Feb. 20); Oscar Schachter, The Emergence of International Environmental Law, 44 J. INT'L AFF. 457
(1991).
2
Anthony D’Amato, THE CONCEPT OF C USTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971); see also Daniel
Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 105, 116 (1995-1996).
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treaty on a particular legal norm provides both evidence of general practice
and a nation’s opinio juris.3 By providing evidence of both elements,
consensus of particular norms appear artificially high based on widely
signed multilateral treaties. This allows advocates to assert that a norm has
risen to the level of customary international norm without regard for
contrary empirical evidence that may weigh against that assertion.
The international legal regime protecting elephants has produced one
such multilateral treaty. The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) provides the African
elephant with the highest level of protection available to endangered
species.4 CITES also addresses several problems specific to elephant
conservation by putting in place ivory trade regulations and creating a
monitoring tool dedicated to elephant poaching. 5 As of October, 2016,
CITES had 183 signatory parties.6 Within the parameters of the treaty, the
elephant garners massive international protections and ivory can only be
traded under limited circumstances. From this perspective, the international
community appears to have reached a consensus regarding elephant
conservation.
Contrast this perspective with the empirical reality of the ivory trade
in China. China is the largest importer of illegally harvested elephant ivory. 7
Demand for carved ivory grows at the pace of China’s middle and upper
class.8 Yet China has been a signatory and full participant 9 in the ivory
3

See infra Part I.b.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, app. I, Mar. 3,
1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
5
See REPORT ON MONITORING THE ILLEGAL KILLING OF ELEPHANTS, CoP17 Doc. 57.5 (Oct. 5,
2016) [hereinafter MIKE]; INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONVENTION, SPECIES TRADE AND
CONSERVATION, ELEPHANTS, MONITORING OF ILLEGAL TRADE IN IVORY AND OTHER ELEPHANT
SPECIMENS, ETIS REPORT OF TRAFFIC, CoP16 Doc. 53.2.2 (Rev. 1) (Mar. 3–14, 2013) [hereinafter ETIS
REPORT]. MIKE tracks the proportion of illegally killed elephants relative to natural deaths. Currently,
roughly 60% of elephants found dead were killed illegally.
6
List of Contracting Parties, CITES, https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php (last visited Jan.
14, 2017).
7
See Made in China, EIA GLOBAL (May 27, 2007), http://eia-global.org/news-media/made-inchina-how-chinas-illegal-ivory-trade-is-causing-a-21st-century-afri; Per Liljas, The Ivory Trade is Out of
Control, and China Needs to Do More to Stop It, TIME (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://world.time.com/2013/11/01/the-ivory-trade-is-out-of-control-and-china-needs-to-do-more-to-stop-it/;
Dan Levin, From Elephants’ Mouths, an Illicit Trail to China, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/world/asia/an-illicit-trail-of-african-ivory-to-china.html
(China’s
involvement in the ivory trade is well documented.).
8
See Elephant Slaughter Escalates as Illegal Ivory Market Thrives, ANIMAL WELFARE INST.,
https://awionline.org/awi-quarterly/2013-winter/elephant-slaughter-escalates-illegal-ivory-market-thrives
(last visited Jan. 14, 2017) (Raw ivory sells for roughly $80 USD per kilogram, typical elephants carry 10
kilograms of ivory. However, worked ivory is worth around $1,800 per kilogram in China.); Jeffrey
4
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control program of CITES since 1991. 10
Given this international
commitment, China’s position on shutting down the trade of ivory should be
clear, and yet, the ivory trade in the region continues unabated. China’s
position on ivory provides a good example of the tension inherent in relying
heavily on treaties as proof of customary law.
China’s actions telegraph two positions to the international
community. First, by signing CITES and rescinding reservations regarding
the ivory trade, China affirmed the treaty’s position on ivory. Second,
China’s open role as the largest end-use market for ivory has persisted for
decades.11 Indeed, as recently as 2015, “the Chinese market has been more
heavily implicated in illicit trade in ivory than any other country.” 12 This
seems to indicate a position antithetical to the ivory regulations created
under CITES.13 Under customary international law (CIL), China’s belief in
the legality of the ivory market has significant consequences for the legal
protection arguably afforded the elephant. Since the available evidence
indicates two contradictory positions, China’s opinio juris is, at best,
unclear.
China’s role in the ivory market make the nation an essential factor
for determining whether elephants are protected under CIL. Significantly,
China’s role in the market, both as a consumer and facilitator for carved
ivory products, suggests that China does not consider itself bound by
international law to protect endangered species like the elephant despite its
ratification of CITES. In spite of this, scholars have argued—based in part
on widespread ratification of CITES—that international protection of
endangered species has become part of CIL. 14 This argument, relying
significantly on CITES to justify the status of endangered species under CIL,
obscures the actual state of ivory trade.

Gentleman, Closing China’s Ivory Market: Will It Save Elephants?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/31/world/africa/africa-ivory-china.html.
9
See CITES, supra note 4, at art. 22.
10
List of Contracting Parties, CITES, https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php (last visited Jan.
14, 2017).
11
ETIS REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.
12
Id.
13
See CITES, supra note 4, at app. II n.6 (exempting Loxodonta Africana).
14
See Gary D. Meyers, Surveying the Lay of the Land, Air, and Water: Features of Current
International Environmental and Natural Resources Law, and Future Prospects for the Protection of
Species Habitat to Preserve Global Biological Diversity, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 479 (1992);
Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1990).
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China’s message to the international community highlights the
difficulty in international law of attributing intention to nations joining
multilateral treaties. Signing a treaty like CITES is a political decision,
often requiring no immediate legal action, but one which purports to indicate
some consensus among the signatories. The continued existence of the ivory
market shows that such a consensus is, at least in part, misleading. If the
widespread ratification of CITES is not indicative of a nation’s position
regarding endangered species, international tribunals should be skeptical of
such inferences. China’s position indicates a conceptual tension between the
function of multilateral treaties and the use of those treaties as evidence of
emerging customary international law. Without adequate regard for both
aspects of the state’s position, the state of customary international law will
not reflect reality.
In section one, this comment provides a basic overview of customary
law and some of its conceptual difficulties. I argue that the element of CIL
distinctly responsible for its ineffectual application is opinio juris. This
section also examines the argument that treaties, specifically multilateral
treaties, provide adequate evidence of a customary norm. Evidence has two
main functions within CIL, it supports the existence of a current norm or
indicates the development of a new norm. Multilateral treaties involve such
complex interactions between parties that their use as evidence of CIL would
seem to supply both of these functions. In section two, I argue that relying
on a multilateral treaty to provide evidence of an emerging customary norm
allows courts, scholars, and policy makers to overlook other relevant
evidence. This results in the erroneous assertion of customary international
law.
The argument that the protection of elephants has risen to the level of
CIL is a poignant example of this error. Section three looks at the state of
elephant populations and the different attempts CITES has made over the
last thirty years to control the ivory trade. It then examines China’s role in
the ivory trade throughout that period. Finally, this comment looks at a
scholarly article from 1990 which argued that protections of elephants as
endangered species had at that time risen to the level of customary
international law. Elephants have been considered endangered species for
decades. The claim that CIL protects the elephant must reconcile itself with
the success or failure of the international community’s past attempts to
control the ivory trade.
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Asserting norms as customary international law without proper
evidence obscures the actual state of problems facing the international
community and slow progress that could otherwise have been made.
International treaties protecting endangered species presents such a distorted
picture. The decline in elephant populations stands in stark contrast to the
claim that the international community wants to protect them. If the African
elephant is truly worth protecting, we ought to be honest about the current
international legal regime protecting the species.
I.

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EVIDENCE THAT IT EXISTS

CIL is typically defined as “international custom, as evidence of
general practice accepted as law.” 15 Generally, custom is created and
sustained by the “constant and uniform practice of States […] in
circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar conduct
in the future.”16 The definition is typically broken down into two parts: 1)
the objective, “constant and uniform practice of States”; and 2) the
subjective, known as opinio juris seu necessitatis, that these actions are
taken from a sense of legal obligation. 17
Looking first at the objective element, state practice is a public
action undertaken by a national entity.19 To be considered CIL, practice
must be “constant and uniform” across states, such that variations from a
particular state or group of states weighs against its status as customary
international law.20 “Although the passage of only a short period of time is
not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary
international law,” the International Court of Justice held in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Case, “State practice, that of States whose interests are
specially affect, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in
18

15

Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179.
See infra note 75, at 720.
17
Francois Geny “offered two elements of custom: usage (repeated practices) and opinio juris seu
necessitatis, the latter meaning that the usage must amount to the “exercise of a (subjective) right of those
who practice it.” David J. Bederman, Acquiescence, Objection and the Death of Customary International
Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 31, 44 (2010) (“[T]he combined objective and subjective inquiries for
CIL formation (state practice and opinio juris) remain the crucial algorithm for establishing whether a norm
really rises to the level of international custom.”).
18
See Committee on Formation of Customary (General) International Law, FINAL REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL C USTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW, International Law Association, Part II(A)(3-6) (2000) [hereinafter ILA REPORT].
19
Id. at Part II(A)(5).
20
Id. at Part II(C)(13).
16
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the sense of the provision invoked.” 21 CIL only forms when a sufficient
number of distinctly affected states participate in a practice.22 When a state
asserts that a practice is part of CIL, the objective element requires proof
that there is actual widespread engagement in that practice.23
For a practice to rise to the level of customary international law, states
must not only uniformly act a certain way, they must also act from the belief
that they are complying with a legal obligation. 24 This sense of legal
obligation, opinio juris, allows international actors to distinguish between
customary international law and acts taken by states out of a sense of
comity, political expedience, or other norms.25 “The need for such a belief,
i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the
opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that
they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency,
or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough.” 26 Without a
legal justification for taking an action, a practice cannot become a customary
international law.27
At its most fundamental level, CIL as a legal system requires clear
rules for determining the significance of state actions. However, while the
rules governing CIL are simple to define, the unwritten nature of CIL makes
it inherently open to changing circumstances. Unlike national laws or treaty
obligations, the formation of customary international law is “by its very
nature the result of an informal process of rule-creation.” 28 Norms are
typically generated by a process of express or implied claim and response.29
21

See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 74
(Feb. 20). In The North Sea Continental Shelf Case, Denmark and the Netherlands disputed the Federal
Republic of Germany’s argument that boundaries along the continental shelf were determined by CIL.
22
Infra note 75, at 720.
23
D’Amato, supra note 2, at 20 (“We must look at what governments do. The objective facts of their
behavior speak louder than any deductive theory.”).
24
Professor James R. Crawford AC, SC, The Identification and Development of Customary
International Law, Spring Conference of the ILA British Branch – Foundations and Futures of International
Law, at 6 (May 23, 2014).
25
D’Amato, supra note 2, at 75.
26
See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 77
(Feb. 20).
27
Id. ¶ 77 (“[T]he acts must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a
belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”).
28
Crawford, supra note 24, at 4 (citing Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law,
272 Hague Academy of International Law, Collected Courses (1998), 155–410, esp. at 172–76).
29
ILA REPORT, supra note 18, at 10 (attributed to example by Myres S. McDougal: if State A
expressly claims the right to exclude foreign warships from passing through its territorial sea, and State B
sends a warship through without seeking the permission of A, this is an implicit claim on the part of B that
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Thus, courts articulate CIL in the context of a dispute between states over
either the emergence of a new rule governing a novel situation or changing
the current state of a law.30 Rather than tracking the state of CIL, the
function of this area of law, as well as the scope of scholarship exploring it,
focus on the mechanisms of changes in the law and evidence of these
changes.31
A.

The Problem of Opinio Juris

Despite the significance of opinio juris, “most commentators
acknowledge that opinio juris is a concept for which it is difficult to account
with any consistency.” 32 One such problem is the inherent circularity of the
definition.33 “It is said that CIL is only law if the opinio juris requirement is
met. That is, it is only law if states believe it is law.” 34 To form a new
customary law, a state would need to feel legally obligated to act according
to a law that doesn’t exist yet. The quixotic struggle of articulating opinio
juris further complicates what can be used as evidence of a nation’s
subjective belief in its legal obligation. 35 Verbal acts36 usually signify this
belief.37
However, courts may give physical acts more weight in
determining CIL.38 Inside the realm of personified state-action, it is difficult
to imagine any other kind of evidence outside of verbal or physical acts.
This ambiguity has led to various accounts of opinio juris that try to capture
both its purpose and current usage.39 Primarily, these accounts try to make
sense of a state’s purported belief when it says one thing and does another.

A has no right to prohibit the passage. If A fails to protest against this infringement, this omission can, in its
turn, constitute a tacit admission of the existence of a right of passage after all.).
30
D’Amato, supra note 2, at 74.
31
Philip Allott, Language, Method and the Nature of International Law, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 103,
129 (1971).
32
Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A Response to Professors
Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 143, 178 (2001); see also J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 450 (2000).
33
Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 124 (2006).
34
Id. (citing D’Amato, supra note 2, at 66).
35
Emily Kadens & Ernest A. Young, How Customary Is Customary International Law?, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 885, 910 (2013).
36
Such as diplomatic statements, policy statements, press releases, official manuals, etc. See ILA
REPORT, supra note 18, Part II(A)(4).
37
Id. Part II(A)(4) commentary at 14.
38
ILA REPORT, supra note 18, Part II(A)(3) commentary at 13; see also D’Amato, supra note 2, at
20 (“The objective facts of their behavior speak louder than any deductive theory.”).
39
See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 33, at 146–48 (providing a rational choice analysis of opinio juris);
Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, 272 RE-CUEIL DES COURS 155,
250 (1998).
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The North Sea Continental Shelf Case had two impacts on these
accounts. It first acknowledged that a “norm-creating provision” of a treaty
could create a rule that becomes “accepted as such by the opinio juris, so as
to have become binding even for countries which have never, and do not,
become parties to”40 that treaty.41 Treaty provisions articulating the parties’
belief about a particular CIL “crystalize” 42 the norm, expressly codifying it
into the language of the treaty. Second, it emphasized the need for
extensive, rather than lengthy, state practice.43 The dispositive factor is the
number of states acting in that manner, not the duration of that practice.
Together, fundamentally norm-creating provisions adopted by a large
number of the international community can “crystalize” customary
international law.44 The idea of a “fundamentally norm-creating character”
of a treaty provision, however novel, indicates the perceived connection
between treaty-making and future third-party international norms.45
Treaties, as a result, have an increasingly “strict relationship” with CIL.46
While this sheds little light on opinio juris as a concept,47 it has led to the
popular theory that treaties are sufficient to form customary international
law.48

40

North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 71 (Feb.

20).
Id. ¶ 70–72.
Id.
43
See Crawford, supra note 24.
44
Id. at 4.
45
ILA REPORT, supra note 18, Part IV(D) (describing the phrase “fundamentally norm-creating
character” as without antecedents in international law and “somewhat Delphic about what it had in mind”).
The International Law Association describes its goal as “the study, clarification and development of
international law, both public and private, and the furtherance of international understanding and respect
for international law."
About Us, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, http://www.ilahq.org/en/about_us/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2017).
46
Crawford, supra note 24, at 3 (citing Tullio Treves, Customary International Law, in M AX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 2).
47
For example, a treaty claiming that it considers provision X as crystalizing customary international
law assumes that the signatory states already felt a legal obligation to do X. Why these nations have this
subjective belief is the question left unanswered.
48
See, e.g., D’Amato, supra note 2; Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction
over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 22
HARV. INT’L L. J. 53 (1981); R. R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International
Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L 275, 278 (1966).
41
42
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Treaties Forming Custom

This section examines the argument advanced in Anthony D’Amato’s
The Concept of Custom in International Law, and by other commentators,49
that treaties can generate customary law. The basic theory outlined by
D’Amato is simple. 50 CIL requires two elements: a quantitative element,
namely practice, and a qualitative element, which D’Amato calls an
articulation.51 Treaties, under this theory, provide evidence of both.
Treaties provide adequate evidence of practice because they supply
the necessary commitment to act and generally imply subsequent
implementation.52 At the moment of ratification, a signatory indicates that
the state will act in a particular way. The state has agreed that the treaty
expresses what it should do, and that variation from the treaty is
presumptively illegal. “Whether or not they subsequently act in conformity
with the treaty, the fact remains that they have so committed to act.”53 State
practice can be wholly evinced by this commitment.
The qualitative element, articulation, requires only that a treaty
specify exactly what signatories commit to do. Unlike the traditional
account of CIL, D’Amato rejects state belief as opinio juris as an
“anthropomorphic fallacy.”54 Rather, the qualitative element requires that
“an objective claim of international legality be articulated in advance of, or
concurrently with, the act which will constitute the quantitative elements of
custom.”55 If the goal is to articulate a norm, then treaties certainly provide
enough qualitative guidance. Most substantive provisions in “multilateral
conventions contain formulations of norms of international law that meet all

49

Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, Multilateral Treaties and the Formation of Customary
International Law, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 71 (1997); Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International
Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 397–400 (1985).
50
To provide some context to its frequent citation, The Concept of Customary International Law was
one of the first accounts to argue comprehensively that treaties can play such a large roll in custom
formation. His account is consistently cited by commentators making a similar arguments and, to this key
thesis, are relatively similar.
51
D’Amato, supra note 2, at 160.
52
Id.
53
Anthony D’Amato, Custom and Treaty: A Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 459, 462 (1988).
54
Id. at 464 (“Thus, there is no reason to call for any such subjective and wholly indeterminate test
of belief when one is attempting to describe how international law works and how its content can be
proved.”).
55
D’Amato, supra note 2, at 74.
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the requirements of articulation.”56 By setting out in writing a legal norm,
the signatory necessarily acknowledges that norm as part of international
law.
These two elements are “used as data to validate alleged norms of
international law in claim-conflict situations.”57 While he does not exclude
the possibility of bilateral treaties creating custom,58 D’Amato and other
commentators focus primarily on multilateral conventions. 59 For R.R.
Baxter, multilateral conventions benefit from clarity:
Since the treaty speaks with one voice rather than fifty, it is
much clearer and more direct evidence of the state of the law
than the conflicting, ambiguous and multi-temporal evidence
that might be amassed through an examination of the practice of
each of the individual States.60
A multilateral treaty best articulates customary international law because it
unifies a wide number of states under a single understanding of expected
legal norms. As a source of data used by courts, multilateral treaties
provides more information in a single source than any other kind of
evidence.61
This account benefits primarily from the fact that international
tribunals actually seem to rely heavily on treaties for evidence of custom.62
While “there is no a priori hierarchy between treaty and custom as sources
of international law…in the application of international law, relevant norms
deriving from treaty will prevail.” 63 However, this account goes further than

56

Id. at 162. Although this may not be the case with bilateral treaties. See North Sea Continental
Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 71–72 (Feb. 20.).
57
D’Amato, supra note 2, at 162.
58
Id. at 164.
59
Scott & Carr, supra note 49, at 72; Stephen Zamora, Is There Customary International Economic
Law?, 32 GERMAN Y.B. INT’ L. 9, 19 (1989).
60
Baxter, supra note 48, at 278.
61
D’Amato, supra note 2, at 164 (“A multilateral convention among ten states is the equivalent of
forty-five similarly worded bilateral treaties among the same ten states.”).
62
See Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, at
256–58 (July 8); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and
Ger/Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 31 (Feb. 20); Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955
I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 4 (Apr. 6).
63
Sands, supra note 73, at 96 (citing Conclusion 10 of Problems arising from a Succession of
Codification Conventions on a Particular Subject, reprinted in 66 Annuaire I.D.I. 435, 441 (1996-II)).
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reliance, arguing that a treaty by itself establishes custom. 64 “[A] treaty is
itself a legal commitment. For that reason alone, it has an impact upon
customary law.”65
This represents a major shift from the International Law Association’s
(“ILA”) view of custom outlined above, but it has intuitive appeal. For
instance, the theory allows for the assertion that torture by a state violates
customary international law, 66 that states have an international obligation to
prevent injury to the environment of another,67 that whales have a right to
life,68 and, relevantly, that endangered species are protected.69 For human
rights and environmental advocates, these assertions represent the ideal state
of international law. However, it seems equally intuitive that evidence of
widespread contrary practice can be found.70 The apparent disparity
between reality and asserted customary international law in these cases
points towards a flaw in the argument.
II.

CUSTOM CANNOT PLAY TWO ROLES WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW

When a treaty fails to solve a problem, asserting that CIL can resolve
what the treaty could not is the next logical legal argument. 71 Where the
object and purpose of a treaty is particularly directed towards addressing
such a problem,72 advocates have limited legal recourse. Advocates in this
situation have only two real legal options: 1) seek to draft another treaty, or
2) assert that CIL now addresses the issue directly. CIL has the additional
benefit of extending legal norms beyond treaty signatories to third party

64

For a well cited example, see Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15
U.N.T.S. 295.
65
D’Amato, supra note 53, at 464.
66
Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110,
1128–29 (1982); see also infra Part V.
67
PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 84–85
(1992).
68
Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT’L L.
21 (1991).
69
Glennon, supra note 14, at 30; see cf. Carr & Scott, supra note 49, at 313.
70
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law:
A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 769 (2001) (stating modern custom is “descriptively inaccurate
because it reflects ideal, rather than actual, standards of conduct.”).
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See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus
Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTRALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 82, 88–90 (1992).
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“Recognizing, in addition, that international co-operation is essential for the protection of certain
species of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through international trade.” CITES, supra note 4,
at preamble ¶ 4.
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states.73 Advocates frequently “make claims about [customary international
law] that are difficult to square with the observed behavior of states.”74 The
crux of this problem comes from the peculiar ontological status CIL has
within international law. CIL reflects both current norms and developing
norms. Indeed, “[d]espite the fact that customary law is one of the two
principal sources of international law (the other being treaty law), there are
inherent serious difficulties in setting out the rules on this subject.”75
Relying on treaties as a sole source of evidence for CIL allows the
aspirational nature of norm-creating treaties, especially prevalent in human
rights and environmental treaties, to appear successful artificially. The
problem with this account is a) that it conflates evidence of custom as
custom itself, at the cost of clarity in the law; and b) as a result, the theory
removes the onus for addressing global problems through alternative, more
effective means while at the same time making it easier to assert newly
formed custom. It asks little of the international community to acknowledge
the binding effect of already ratified multilateral treaties, even if those
treaties are not followed.
A.

The Dual Legal Function of Treaties is One Too Many

The defect in D’Amato’s account is best seen in contrast with the
current ILA definition of multilateral treaties as evidence of customary
international law. The ILA makes a purposeful distinction between actions
taken under a treaty obligation and those that arise from opinio juris.76
Multilateral treaties most constitute evidence of CIL when they either
explicitly crystalize the understanding of the parties regarding CIL, or when
the treaty has been used to structure agreements between parties and nonparties.77
There is no presumption that multilateral treaties provide evidence of
a customary rule; if a nation acts only out of obligation to conform with a

73

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 38, May 5, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; ILA
REPORT, supra note 18, Part I(1)(iii); see also Philippe Sands, Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization
of International Law, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85, 93 (1998).
74
Guzman, supra note 33, at 118 (citing Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980))
(arguing that torture is a violation of customary human rights); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. g. & rep. n.5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
75
ILA REPORT, supra note 18, at 2.
76
Id. at 46.
77
Id.; see, e.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 64, art. X (codifying
sovereignty over a nation’s territory).
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treaty, the nation is not conforming to a new CIL. 78 Multilateral treaties
provide evidence of new customary rules through state practice only insofar
as the treaty promotes state practice outside of strict treaty obligation. 79
Actions towards non-party members provides evidence of CIL precisely
because the treaty imposes no obligations between those states.80 According
to this account, treaties rarely codify custom unless the treaty makes that fact
explicit, because “it would not be worth the parties’ effort to do so.”81
Multilateral treaties are an increasingly important82 source of evidence
for CIL, but to say they therefore fully express CIL expands the scope of
state obligations; a logical step incompatible with the ILA account. Strictly
speaking, under the ILA view, if every state were to sign a treaty to do X
practice, and then continuously did X, it could not become a customary
international norm. There would be no legal obligation imposed external to
the treaty.83
The argument that treaties form custom collapses the distinction
between these two obligations. A treaty must provide both evidence of
practice and opinio juris. “Articulation” expresses an aggregated assertion
of integrational law, both of customary law and the treaty. Equating the two
sources of international law provides a conceptually tidy account of CIL and
reduces the number of sources needed by tribunals and commentators to
show custom.84 Custom formation is logically distinct from evidence
proving that custom. Evidence of something does not necessarily constitute
the thing itself.85 And yet, if treaties occupy a dual role in custom
generation, treaty as evidence of custom must also form custom.
D’Amato’s explanation of the customary prohibition against torture in
the face of significant evidence of contrary government practice highlights
78

ILA REPORT, supra note 18, at 46.
Id.; see, e.g., Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major War
Criminals, UK Command Paper Cmd. 6964, at 65 (1946).
80
ILA REPORT, supra note 18, at 47.
81
Id. at 26.
82
Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary International Law Modifies Treaties,
41 YALE J. INT’L L. 237, 244 (2016) (citing Charlotte Ku, Global Governance and the Changing Face of
International Law, in 2 ACAD. COUNCIL U.N. SYS. REP. & PAPERS 1, 5 (2001)) (“According to one study,
eighty-six multilateral treaties were concluded in the century between 1648 through 1748-but more than
two thousand such treaties were concluded in the twenty-five years between 1951 and 1975!”).
83
See ILA REPORT, supra note 18, at 46.
84
See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. and Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Feb.
20); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
85
See Immanuel Kant, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 26-33 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., abr. ed.
1934).
79
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the error of confusing evidence of custom with custom.86 The United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 87 purports to do just that, ban torture;
arguendo, its ratification provides evidence for, and represents the formation
of, a customary international law against torture. Yet states continue to
torture. Rather than conclude that the issue is unresolved, D’Amato
undervalues the value of this evidence that would undermine his account by
giving an odd example to clarify his position.
Namely, the fact that governments do not admit to torture indicates
the prohibition’s status under CIL: states appoint commissions to investigate
instances of torture, and they do not claim to torture legally. 88 He contrasts
this with the state of torture during the medieval Spanish Inquisition, where
states would certainly admit that torture was legal. 89 Essentially, the
prohibition against torture survives contrary evidence because the treaty
remains in effect and governments act as if they recognize the criminality of
torture they are themselves committing. The Convention proves that there is
a customary prohibition against torture and provides evidence of that custom
to rebut contrary evidence. Except for the treaty, as a dual source of
international law, the acts of states would not support this conclusion.90
III.

THE ROLE OF CUSTOMARY NORMS WITHOUT CONSEQUENCE

At the very least, the fact that a state in the example above can
consistently violate a norm-creating provision of a treaty with impunity
while at the same time providing evidence of that norm as customary law
contradicts basic expectations of a legal rule.91 Responding to similar
criticism, D’Amato seems to see this as one of the benefits of his approach.92
It allows scholars to assert that certain desirable norms, like the prohibition
against torture, are legal obligations states must follow, regardless of their
actual compliance.93 What would be the alternative? What benefit could be
D’Amato, supra note 53, at 464 (citing D’Amato, supra note 66, at 126).
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
88
D’Amato, supra note 53, at 467.
89
Id.
90
See Mark A. Weisburd, Customary International Law and Torture: The Case of India, 2 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 81 (2001).
91
See Arthur Weisburd, A Reply to Professor D’Amato, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 473, 477
(1988).
92
D’Amato, supra note 53, at 472.
93
Id.
86
87
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derived from undermining the claim that torture is internationally illegal?94
For D’Amato, a world where nations must hide the fact that they
torture is preferable to one where they do not. Arthur Weisburd provides a
clear counterpoint to this argument, specifically regarding torture.95 Rather
than posit the existence of a customary norm against torture, Weisburd
concludes that:
[A] large number of states are not ready to give up the authority
to treat their citizens in a beasty fashion. Proclaiming that such
action is illegal amounts to proclaiming that international law is
ineffective, since the beastlieness [sic] continues despite the
denunciation.96
Unsurprisingly, the contrast between these two views is clearest when a
widely ratified, norm-creating, multilateral treaty has been empirically
unsuccessful at resolving the problem it set out to solve.97
IV.

ELEPHANT PROTECTION UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

This next section compares the state of African elephant populations
with the international protections afforded protected species under CITES.
Specifically, it looks at China’s involvement both as a signatory of CITES
and as a state uniquely involved in the ivory trade.98 This account seeks to
show the disparity between the aspirations of the international community
and the empirical reality of the elephant’s legal status as a protected species.
A.

International State of the Ivory Trade Under CITES

Since 2010, illegal killing has been responsible for over 60% of
elephant deaths.99 2016 saw “the largest ever continent-wide wildlife
survey, the Great Elephant Census,” which found that 352,271 savanna
elephants are left in the species range.100 Largely the result of poaching, the
Anthony D’Amato, A Brief Rejoinder, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 489, 490 (1988).
Weisburd, supra note 91, at 477.
96
Id. at 487.
97
Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L. J. 1935 (2002).
98
CITES, Monitoring of Illegal Trade in Ivory and Other Elephant Specimens, Co.P16 Doc. 53.2.2
(Mar. 3, 2013) (considering China a “single country cluster with unique attributes as the premier end-use
market.”).
99
See MIKE, supra note 5.
100
Paul Steyn, African Elephant Numbers Plummet 30 Percent, Landmark Survey Finds, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 31, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/08/wildlife-african-elephantspopulation-decrease-great-elephant-census/.
94
95
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elephant population has declined at a yearly rate of 8% since 2010.101 While
shocking, these losses to illegal poaching are hardly new. 102 Elephant
poaching rates, which continue to exceed natural elephant population growth
rates, remained virtually unchanged over the last six years. 103 Poaching
continues despite the fact African Elephant (Loxodonta Africana) occupies
the highest level of protection afforded by the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.104
The parties of CITES have not been idle in combating the illegal
poaching of elephants. Under CITES, species are listed in three appendixes,
the first is reserved for “all species threatened with extinction which are or
may be affected by trade.”105 It allows export of a specimen with a permit
when “a Scientific Authority of the State of export has advised that such
export will not be detrimental to the survival of that species.”106 Concerned
that the ivory trade would continue unabated, in 1985 the parties created a
quota and identifying system for managing the export of ivory. 107 Under the
system, the Secretariat tallies the number of tusks exported to ensure the
quota is followed, and sanctions the permit and import of ivory before a
country can accept a shipment.108 The parties saw this as a compromise for
developing nations who wanted to use their natural resources and nations
seeking to end illegal ivory harvesting. 109
This compromise was unsuccessful and throughout the 1980s the
ivory trade boomed. 110 Game wardens were consistently undermined by
better-financed poachers.111 A typical game warden is one of between 15 to
90 guards employed to guard anywhere from 1 to 3 million acres of land. 112
101

Id.
See Konrad von Moltke, Brand Name Ivory: An Alternative Way to Think About the Ivory Trade, 2
J. INT’L WILDLIFE L. & POL’Y 79 (1999).
103
Press Release, CITES, Elephant Poaching rates Virtually unchanged in 2014 (Mar. 23, 2015),
https://cites.org/eng/mike_figures2014).
104
CITES, app. I, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087; but cf. CITES, app. II, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087
(exemptions for “Populations of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.”).
105
CITES, art. II(1), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087.
106
Glennon, supra note 14, at 11 (citing CITES, art. III (2)(a), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087).
107
Id. at 12.
108
Id.
109
Thaddeus McBride, The Dangers of Liberal Neo-Colonialism: Elephants, Ivory and the CITES
Treaty, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 733, 736 (1999).
110
Glennon, supra note 14, at 20.
111
See id. at 21 (The funding needed to stop poaching in Kenya’s Tsavo National park alone would
have been roughly $1.6 million a day).
112
John A. Hart & Kes H. Smith, TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 3: MONITORING OF ELEPHANT POACHING,
ANTI102
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Of this area, wardens patrol on average 25% of that total area.113 Poachers,
on the other hand, are financed by complex criminal syndicates, have the
benefit of poor, corrupt government officials, and a steady supply of illegal
weaponry.114 Without addressing the porous borders of wildlife reserves or
the import of illegal arms, the trade restrictions were ill-equipped to disincentivize organized crime from hiring locals to harvest ivory.
Ultimately the system had an insignificant effect on ivory production:
it was voluntary and “other CITES parties had no legal basis under CITES
for refusing entry to producer state’s ivory.” 115 In response to the ineffective
quota system, the parties voted to enact a total ban on ivory trade in 1989, at
the objection of several Southern African nations.116 The ban lasted eight
years ending at the 1997 Conference of the Parties (Co10) during which time
elephant populations had increased over Southern Africa.117 After the total
ban was rescinded, the opposite trend was predictable; twenty years later,
evidence indicates that the illegal trade in ivory has progressively escalated
since the ban.118 Wildlife is now one of the “top global sources of illegal
wealth.”119
B.

China’s Opinio Juris Regarding Elephants as a Protected
Species

This escalation is even more apparent when narrowed to China’s role
in the ivory trade.120 Throughout these regulatory shifts, both state and
private Chinese action continued to promote the flow of ivory from Africa
into Asia.121 For instance, the 1989 ivory ban excluded ivory harvested
POACHING EFFORT, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CENTRAL AFRICA, https://www.cites.org/eng/prog/mike/pi
lot/tech_rep3.shtml (Oct. 2001) (citing Table 1, part 1).
113
Id. (citing Table 2, part 2).
114
Adam Vaughan, Kenya's New Front in Poaching Battle: The Future is in the Hands of our
Communities,
THE
GUARDIAN
(May
30,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/may/30/kenya-poaching-elephant-ivory-rhino-hornfuture-communities (three poachers took out 27 elephants in fifteen minutes).
115
Glennon, supra note 14, at 21.
116
Namely Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. See List of Contracting Parties, CITES,
https://cites.org/eng/disc/parties/chronolo.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2017).
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See McBride, supra note 109, at 745 (1999).
118
CITES, Monitoring of Illegal Trade in Ivory and Other Elephant Specimens, Co.P16 Doc. 53.2.2
(Mar. 3, 2013).
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Sam Weru, WILDLIFE PROTECTION AND TRACKING ASSESSMENT IN KENYA 16 (2006) (Table 7).
120
China was labeled a party of “primary concern” in the national ivory action plan proposed for the
65th meeting of the Standing Committee (Geneva, July 2014).
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See Made in China: How China‘s Illegal Ivory Trade Is Causing a 21st Century African Elephant
Disaster,
ENVTL.
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AGENCY
(May
16,
2007),
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before 1989, called “pre-convention” ivory.122 During the 1990s, China
allowed that exclusion to be applied retroactively for traders who “forgot” to
register ivory as pre-convention ivory.123 Half of all ivory seized in 1999
was destined for China. 124 Elephant Trade Information System Report
(ETIS) singles out China as the country with the most heavily implicated
market in the illicit ivory trade in terms of frequency and scale of seizures.125
The report notes:
The number of ivory seizures that China has made over the
three-year period 2009 to 2011 is nearly nine times greater than
the three-year period 2006 to 2008[.] […] [T]he number of
seizures made by other countries which implicate China in the
trade has also increased by nearly five-fold over the same
period of time..126
While the report also indicates that China has taken a comprehensive
approach to law enforcement, it found no noticeable deterrent effect from
China’s increased policing.127
In September 24, 2015, President Xi Jinping issued a joint statement
committing both countries to “nearly complete bans on ivory imports and
exports…and to take significant and timely steps to halt the domestic
commercial trade of ivory.” 128 Months later, in China the price of ivory
halved.129 However, reports of non-compliance with ivory trade regulations
continued throughout this period. 130 Troublingly, one report indicated that
Bennett, Answering 'The Call of the Wild': An Examination of US Participation in International Wildlife
Law, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 114 (1989).
122
CITES, art. VII (2), Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087.
123
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124
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25, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25/opinion/25iht-edwalker.html; Catherine Elkemann &
Oliver C. Ruppel, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment into Africa in the Context of BRICS and Sino-African
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 13 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 593, 616-17 (2015).
125
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129
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officials and traders continue to subvert the purpose of ivory regulations by
misapplying the narrow “pre-convention” exception to the ivory ban.131
In its entirety, China’s response to the provisions of the CITES treaty
has been divided. On the one hand officials and law enforcement have taken
steps to limit the ivory trade, and made statements that these steps were
taken out of a sense of legal obligation. However, the continued success of
the illegal ivory market, and the state’s overall resistance to ivory regulation
complicates China’s position. Importantly, China’s opinion juris regarding
the protections afforded elephants in international law is not simple or
consistent.
Under D’Amato’s theory articulated in section 1(b), China’s position
would be clear and look entirely different. As a signatory of CITES, China
would have committed to protecting endangered species like the elephant
and upholding the restrictions on ivory trade. Indeed, relying solely on this
fact would have entirely contradictory ramifications for CIL. It should be
unsurprising then that advocates for the protection of endangered species
adopt D’Amato’s theory of CIL.
C.

An Environmentalist Response to Persistent Ivory Poaching

The death of the last elephant would represent an abject failure of the
entire conservationist movement. Within the field of conservationist
biology, elephants are considered a “charismatic megafauna”: large, popular
species that act as flagships for conservation campaigns. 132 If the
international community cannot protect the elephant, an internationally
loved yet commercially desirable species, other, less attractive animals will
not fare better. The fate of the elephant as a species should be a good overall indicator of the international community’s ability to protect endangered
species.
The connection between the elephant’s survival as an endangered
species and the need for successful international action can be seen in
Michael Glennon’s, “Has International Law Failed the Elephant?” 133
Despite CITES’ inconsistent ability to protect the elephant, as an endangered
species, Glennon argued that this protection has risen to the level of
131
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customary international law, based substantially on the widespread
ratification of the treaty.134 Paralleling D’Amato, he argues that treaties
create CIL “‘when such agreements are intended for adherence by states
generally and are in fact widely accepted.’” 135 CITES is his primary
example.136 Glennon then references several factors that support CITES as
appropriate evidence of his claim. The treaty is norm-creating, some nonparties comply with certain CITES documentary requirements, and it has not
been rejected by a significant number of non-party states.137 As additional
evidence for the position that states are obligated to protect endangered
species, Glennon names the World Charter for Nature138 where the General
Assembly proclaimed “that the population levels of all life forms, wild and
domesticated, must be at least sufficient for their survival.” 139
Glennon’s assertion of CIL matches his normative goal: nations ought
to use more legal and economic resources to stop the decline of elephant
populations. For western states, that requires funding nations with elephant
populations to support conservation.140 However, his argument that
elephants have this kind of legal protection internationally stands in stark
contrast to the empirical reality discussed above. This is as clear now as it
was in 1990. CIL does not protect elephants.
D.

Customary International Norms Should Not Reflect Normative
Aspirations

Glennon’s argument stems from a problematic account of customary
international law that too easily grants the existence of norms based on
treaties like CITES. Nor is Glennon alone in attempting to solve an
environmental problem by resorting to CIL. 141 For these advocates,
declaring protective environmental norms as CIL will extend actual
protection to the environment rather than reflecting the state of international
law. As Glennon’s article has aged, this has not been the effect.
134

Id.
Glennon, supra note 14, at 30 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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137
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139
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Rejecting Glennon’s claim that elephants are protected by CIL does
not require ignoring his normative argument, that elephant populations ought
to be preserved.142 However, it begs the same question asked by D’Amato
discussed above, why argue against protecting elephants? A world where
CITES has created this international norm is better than one where it has not.
This gets at the foundation of why custom exists: Is it aspirational or
pragmatic? If it is the former, then D’Amato and Glennon are simply
arguing that nations are aware that they should not torture people, or kill
elephants for ivory, when a norm becomes part of CIL.
I argue that the international community is better off taking the
pragmatic approach; CIL should reflect what nations do, not what we would
like them to do. Just as arguing that CIL protects elephants does not actually
protect the species, stating that there is no CIL protecting elephants will not
suddenly begin a poaching spree.143 A pragmatic approach to CIL benefits
from acknowledging that the problem has not been served by the current
legal scheme. Legal decision makers are the real target audience for
writings on customary international law. 144 Societal problems are better
addressed by “building consensus” in support of the authors position or “by
coercing” bad actors to stop, neither of which are legal determinations. 145
Treaties-as-custom provides a simple solution for a complex problem.
Blurring the role played by treaties in international law and custom
formation does not resolve the problem of opinio juris, it ignores it.146 For
example, Weisburd argues that the stronger indication of CIL is the extent to
which breach of that norm would result in legal consequences. 147 Among
these consequences are the right to inquire into the facts of the alleged
breach and, if established, the legal duty to repair the breach.148 Here, opinio
juris, that nations must not only feel legally obligated to act a certain way
but also obligated to facilitate sanctions against breach of that norm, better
142
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clarifies the conceptual issues of what exactly opinio juris is. Tying opinio
juris to a legal consequence corresponds to the intuitive belief that violating
a legal norm should have a consequence. It also explains how custom is
established. Since consequences actually flow from a norm rising to the
level of customary international law, evidence of those consequences
provide the evidence of nation’s subjective intent.
V.

CONCLUSION

Authors frequently point to the role of consent in a positivist
international legal world as the foundation for enforcement.149 This is
especially true where, absent a written treaty, norms are imposed on states
who seem to have never addressed the issue. 150 Internationally the rules of
law are binding on states “from their own free will.” 151 One key facet of this
positivist view is the idea that nations—absent some legislative body—do
not, and will not, consider legally binding laws with which they do not
agree.152
Consent as a concept “raises an obvious barrier to the idea that
multilateral treaties create customary international law and thereby obligate
non-signatories to abide by their terms.”153 This obvious barrier is simply
that nations who agree on some particular norm cannot then impose that
norm on another unilaterally or instantaneously. As seen in the case of
China and the ivory trade, this is not an abstract barrier to international
enforcement of legal norms but an observed reality. Using simplified
methods for determining custom does not overcome this fact.
This article attempts to take serious the idea that nations, who do not
feel bound to protect the elephant, will not suddenly and enthusiastically
fight syndicated poaching throughout Africa because the species becomes
protected by CIL. Significantly, proclaiming custom with uncertain
evidence diminishes the legal weight of CIL. Scholars should look to the
149
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reciprocal nature of rights and obligation necessary of a legal norm when
asserting custom.154 “The creation of customary international law is not
momentary. It emanates from an ‘intensive dialectical process’ between
different actors of the international community.” 155 Cutting short that
process, by asserting CIL where it may not exist, creates the false impression
that the problem is solved. More elephants are illegally killed each year than
are born,156 the elephant does not have time under the present international
protections to wait for the legal community to discover that they were
wrong.
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155
156

See Weisburd, supra note 146, at 8.
Allott, supra note 31, at 129.
See MIKE, supra note 5.
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